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The Constitutional Right of Pretrial
Detainees: A Healthy Sense of Realism?
Bell v. Wolfish' represents the United States Supreme Court's first
opportunity to delineate the scope of the constitutional rights retained by
pretrial detainees. 2 In Bell, detainees housed at the Metropolitan Correc-
tional Center, a federally operated detention facility, brought a class action
suit challenging the constitutionality of a variety of the conditions of their
confinement. The ultimate issue in the case was the nature and scope of the
rights retained by an individual once he is detained by the government
pending trial on a criminal charge. To resolve that issue, the Court first had
to decide what the appropriate standard was for reviewing a detention
official's decision to impose particular restrictions upon pretrial detainees.
Before approaching the Court's resolution of these issues, some of the
relevant background authority will be discussed in Section I. The Supreme
Court has decided several prisoner's rights cases, some of which will be
considered below. While both prisoners and detainees have been incarcer-
ated by the government, they have been incarcerated for different reasons.
The convicted prisoner has been incarcerated for punishment, while the
detainee has been incarcerated because either the offense with which he is
charged is not bailable or he has been unable to pay the bail that was set.
Since the purposes behind the individual's incarceration should play a
significant role in the treatment he receives while imprisoned or detained,
the objectives of the bail system will be examined in Section II. Section III
will review the various approaches the circuit courts have taken with
respect to the standard of review to be applied to detention facility officials'
decisions regarding the conditions and practices of pretrial detention. The
facts and holding of Bell, the majority's rationale, and the approaches
advocated by the dissents will be set out in Section IV, which will also
analyze the majority opinion in light of relevant precedent and the objec-
tives of the bail system.
I. THE PRISONER'S RIGHTS CASES
Belly. Wolfish3 was the first case to be considered by the United States
Supreme Court dealing with the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.
The Court had, however, previously decided numerous cases dealing with
the rights of convicted prisoners.
American courts have traditionally been reluctant to become involved
1. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
2. Throughout this Comment the term "prisoner" will be used only with reference to those who
have been incarcerated as punishment for having committed a crime. The term "detainee" is reserved
for those who have been charged with a crime but have not yet had a trial.
3. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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in the complexities of penal administration.4 The courts viewed this area to
be within the responsibility of the executive branch of the government.
Most judges felt it was not within their authority to question the discretion-
ary decisions of prison officials. This "hands-off' approach prevailed in
American jurisprudence until the late 1960s.
The Supreme Court took an affirmative step toward changing this
attitude in Lee v. Washington In that case the Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling applying the equal protection clause to invalidate particular
Alabama statutes requiring racial segregation in prisons and jails.
In Cruz v. Beto6 the Court recognized the applicability of the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of religion in the prison context. The
Court acknowledged that while prison authorities "must be accorded
latitude in the administration of prison affairs, 7 prisoners are persons
whose constitutional rights must be enforced by the federal courts.
Procunier v. Martinez,8 decided in 1974, is also illustrative of this
trend. The primary issue was whether the prison's mail censorship rule
violated the first amendment rights of the prisoners.9 The Court pointed
out that "a healthy sense of realism '' required the recognition that courts
are not well equipped to handle the pressing problems of prison adminis-
tration. Nonetheless, valid constitutional claims must be heard, and, if
fundamental constitutional rights are impinged by a particular regulation
or practice, the federal courts must act.
In Martinez, however, the Court did not deal directly with the prison-
4. Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REv.
841, 842-44 (1971).
5. 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
6. 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 321.
8. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
9. Director's Rule 2401 provided:
The sending and receiving of mail is a privilege, not a right, and any violation of the rules
governing mail privileges either by you or by your correspondents may cause suspension of
the mail privileges.
Director's Rule 1201 provided:
INMATE BEHAVIOR: Always conduct yourself in an orderly manner. Do not fight or take
part in horseplay or physical encounters except as part of the regular athletic program. Do
not agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave in any way which might lead to
violence.
The term "unduly complain" and "magnify grievances" covered statements made in the inmates'
personal letters. Director's Rule 1205 provided:
The following is contraband:
d. Any writings or voice recordings expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or
other views or beliefs when not in the immediate possession of the originator, or when the
originator's possession is used to subvert prison discipline by display or circulation.
Rule 1205 also provides that writings
not defined as contraband under this rule, but which, if circulated among other inmates,
would in the judgment of the warden or superintendent tend to subvert prison order or
discipline, may be placed in the inmate's property, to which he shall have access under
supervision.
10. 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
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er's rights. It turned instead to a more narrow question: are the first
amendment rights of those outside the institution who communicate with
inmates violated by this rule?" This question was answered with a condi-
tional "yes"; the mail could not be censored unless two conditions were
met. The first required that the rule "further an important or substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. 12 Such
interests included security, order, and rehabilitation. The other condition
was that the restriction of speech be no more than was necessary to protect
the government's interest. Applying this standard to the regulation in
issue, the Court held it invalid.
The Martinez Court went on to state that even under a valid regula-
tion, the decision to withhold or censor a letter must be accompanied by
notice and the inmate must be allowed an opportunity to protest the
decision. 3 This was based upon the Court's decision that freedom of
communication is a "liberty" interest within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment due process clause.
A regulation prohibiting attorneys from using paralegals and law
students to conduct inmate interviews was also struck down in Martinez.14
The Court held that this regulation violated the due process clause since it
restricted the prisoners' access to the courts.
Pell v. Procunier,15 also decided in 1974, reflects the Court's growing
apprehension of becoming involved in the problem of prison administra-
tion. The inmates in Pell challenged the constitutionality of a regulation in
the California Department of Corrections Manual 16 that prohibited "press
and other media interviews with specific individual inmates."' 17 The Court
upheld the constitutionality of the regulation, stating that only those first
amendment freedoms consistent with the status of a prisoner as a prisoner
or with the goals of the corrections system are retained upon
incarceration.s
In Pell, the Court held the institution's goals of maintaining security
and avoiding administrative problems required that such interviews be
limited.' 9 The Court declared that "[s]uch considerations are peculiarly
within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and,
in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters." 20 Thus,
11. Id. at 408.
12. Id. at 413.
13. Id. at 418.
14. Id. at 419.
15. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
16. CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS MANUAL § 415.071.
17. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 819 (1974).
18. Id. at 822.
19. Id. at 826.
20. Id. at 827.
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the burden of proving the excessiveness of a restriction of first amendment
freedoms was placed upon the prisoner. The Court admitted that the
courts must continue to protect fundamental freedoms, 2' but when free-
dom of speech is at issue such intervention is to be limited to those
situations in which there is no alternative method of communication and
"discrimination in terms of content is involved. 22
Another important opinion concerning the scope of the constitutional
rights retained by prisoners is Wolff v. McDonnell. 3 Prisoners had
charged that the prison's disciplinary proceedings violated due process
because good-time credits24 could be revoked and solitary confinement
could be imposed without giving the prisoner a prior hearing. They also
alleged that the legal assistance program fell below constitutional stand-
ards and that rules relating to the inspection of attorney-client mail
violated the first amendment.
The Court in Wolfffirst held that while lawful incarceration limits the
rights of prisoners, some of the protections of the due process clause do
remain.25 "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and
the prisons of this country.6 These rights are, however, "subject to
restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which they [prisoners]
have been lawfully committed. 2 ' The Court called for a "mutual accom-
modation" between constitutional provisions and the goals of the
institution.28 The Court also held that since the state had created the right
to good-time credit, the prisoner was entitled to it if he met all the
requirements set out in the statute.29 The Court characterized this entitle-
ment to good-time credit as a "liberty" interest that could not be denied
without notice and a hearing. The Court also recognized the prisoners'
21. Id.
22. Id. at 826.
23. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
24. Provision for good-time credits is made by NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Cum. Supp. 1972):
(1) The chief executive officer of a facility shall reduce for parole purposes, for good behavior
and faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility the term of a committed
offender as follows: Two months on the first year, two months on the second year, three
months on the third year, four months for each succeeding year of his term and pro rata for
any part thereof which is less than a year. In addition, for especially meritorious behavior or
exceptional performance of his duties, an offender may receive a further reduction, for parole
purposes, not to exceed five days, for any month of imprisonment. The total of all such
reductions shall be deducted:
(a) From his minimum term, to determine the date of his eligibility for release on parole; and
(b) From his maximum term to determine the date when his release on parole becomes man-
datory under the provisions of section 83-1, 111.
(2) Reductions of such terms may be forfeited, withheld and restored by the chief executive
officer of the facility after the offender has been consulted regarding the charges of miscon-
duct. No reduction of an offender's term for especially meritorious behavior or exceptional
performance of his duties shall be forfeited or withheld after an offender is released on parole.
25. 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
26. Id. at 555-56.
27. Id. at 556.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 557.
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"liberty" interest in freedom from disciplinary confinement and held that
the same procedures used in good-time revocation were required before
imposition of solitary confinement.30
The Wolff Court further held that allowing the inmate to be present
during the inspection of mail from his attorney would be sufficient to meet
constitutional mandates.3 Further proceedings were ordered on the ade-
32quacy of the legal assistance program.
The question whether the due process clause prohibits a prisoner from
being transferred without a prior hearing to another institution at which
conditions were inferior was presented in Meachum v. Fano.33 The Court
held that no such hearing was required because the inmates had no
constitutionally protected "liberty" interest.3 4 The prisoners' asserted in-
terest in not being transferred was found to be neither expressly protected
by the Constitution35 nor created by state law.36 The Court held, in effect,
that no matter how grievous the loss inflicted upon the transferred prison-
er, no process is due because he is not entitled to remain where he is.
37
The Court took a major step toward returning to the "hands-off'
approach in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union.38 Certain
regulations promulgated by the North Carolina Department of Correc-
tions were challenged as violative of the free speech, association, and equal
protection rights of the inmates' labor union. 39 The Court held that the first
and fourteenth amendments do not apply to prisoners' labor unions.40
The Court declared that the fact of imprisonment itself limits the
inmates' freedom to associate with outsiders and that the needs of the
institution require limitations on their rights to associate with each other.
Thus, regulations alleged unconstitutionally to restrict freedom of associa-
tion are subject to a test similar to that applied to restrictions of freedom of
speech in Pell 4 2 The regulation need only be "rationally related to the
reasonable . . . objectives of prison administration. 43 The burden of
proof in this context, as in Pell, is on the prisoner to show that "officials
have exaggerated their response to these considerations.""
30. Id. at 571-72 n.19.
31. Id. at 580.
32. Id.
33. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
34. Id. at 224.
35. Id. at 225.
36. Id. at 228.
37. The Court's holding in these latter two cases is consistent with the development of due
process adjudication not only in the prisoner's rights context but as applied generally. See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 502-50 (1978).
38. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
39. Id. at 121.
40. Id. at 136.
41. Id. at 126.
42. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
43. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977).
44. Id. at 128.
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Thus the Court's attitude toward the propriety of intervening into the
realm of prison administration has not been static. Traditionally the Court
had chosen to ignore the cries of the prisoners in deference to the officials
charged with their care. Recently a new trend had developed, one by which
the Court had begun to listen to the complaints of the imprisoned. Jones,
however, marked a return to the days in which the Court chose to keep its
"hands-off."
II. BAIL AND DETENTION
There is a vital difference between a convicted prisoner and a detainee.
The prisoner is incarcerated because he has been found guilty of a crime by
a court of law. The detainee is incarcerated because there is probable cause
that he has committed a crime 46 and, because of the nature of the particular
crime or because of his poverty, he has not been released on bail. Since the
convicted prisoner was found guilty of a crime, he has been incarcerated
for punishment. The detainee, however, has been incarcerated for other
reasons.
The eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of excessive bail.47 In
Carlson v. Landon,48 however, the Court expressly stated that bail need
not be set in all cases. 49 Congress and the state legislatures may define those
classes of cases in which bail will be allowed. Thus, bail is not required in
those instances in which the accused, if found guilty, may be punished by
death. 50 This does not, however, mean that only those charged with capital
crimes are detained in lieu of bail. In fact, the vast majority of those
detained are not charged with capital crimes; they are detained simply
because they cannot afford the bail that was set.
51
Bail statutes usually state that the purposes of bail are (1) securing the
attendance of the accused at trial and (2) preventing his punishment before
conviction. 52 These statutes, of course, reflect the legislative point of view.
Many of these statutes provide no guidelines to aid judges in setting the
proper amount of bail. Even when such guidelines are provided, they may
not be followed because judges often view the goals of the bail system from
a perspective different from that of state legislatures and Congress.
45. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
46. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
47. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
48. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
49. Id. at 546.
50. Id. See also the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P.46(c).
51. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 629 (1979). Table 6:20 indicates that bail was set for 81% of those jailed
pending trial. But for their inability to pay this bail, these persons would have been freed. Those for
whom no bail was set constituted only 17% of the detainee population. Id.
52. P. WICE, BAIL AND ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY, SUMMARY REPORT (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as LEAA SURVEY].
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Among the objectives that judges feel the bail system should fulfill are
(1) punishment, (2) preventive detention, (3) rehabilitation, and (4) rapid
disposition of cases. 5" First, a judge who feels the defendant is guilty may
set a very high bail to insure that the defendant suffers at least a temporary
economic hardship and perhaps even incarceration.5 4 Second, bail may be
set excessively high in an effort to see that the accused is detained so that
society can be protected from any crimes he might commit if released. A
third objective is rehabilitation. The judge may feel that requiring the
accused to spend time in detention before a hearing will frighten him into
good behavior upon his subsequent release." This is particularly true with
respect to young first offenders. Finally, bail is used to force rapid disposi-
tion of cases. A magistrate may use the threat of setting bail at a high rate as
a tool in acquiring an immediate guilty plea.
5 6
The defendant's financial status, which will determine the amount of
bail he can afford to pay, is rarely considered by the magistrate when
setting the amount of bail.5 7 It is ironic that this particular factor does not
play a more central role since it is the most common determinant of an
accused's ability to obtain pretrial release. It is particularly disturbing in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Stack v. Boyle" that "the fixing of
bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to
the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant." 59
Of all persons charged with serious misdemeanors or felonies, ap-
proximately twenty percent are detained in lieu of bail.60 "In terms of the
number of persons affected per year, pretrial custody accounts for more
incarceration in the United States than does imprisonment after senten-
cing.",6' A detainee may spend as much as eight months in jail prior to
trial.62 The costs of such detention must be borne by the detainee, his
family, and the public. "In most instances, the financial, human, and social
costs of the detention far outweigh any benefit the public receives from
total confinement."63
53. Id. at 5-6.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. This threat often works because where a fine is imposed it frequently will be less than the
bail that would have been set, and where a prison term is imposed, it is very likely that the physical
condition of the prison will be better than that of the jail where he would have been detained pending
trial.
57. Id. at 14.
58. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
59. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
60. LEAA SURVEY, supra note 52 at 22.
61. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS: CORRECTIONS 102, 109
(1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS]. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 281 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("In New York City as of 1964, 49% of those accused were imprisoned before
trial, while only 40% were imprisoned after conviction.").
62. A.B.A. PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO PRE-TRIAL RELEASE 3 (1968).
63. CORRECTIONS, supra note 61, at 99.
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Thus, it can be seen that the bail system is not what it should be.
Justice Jackson stated in Stack v. Boyle:
64
The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American law, is
not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found
convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is
to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.6 5
Unfortunately for many detainees, the system is not administered in this
"spirit." It is often administered by judges with other goals in mind.
III. THE STANDARDS APPLIED TO THE CONDITIONS OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Bell v. Wolfish66 is the first case in which the Supreme Court has
considered the standard of review to be used in determining the scope of
the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees. The courts of appeals,
however, have faced the issue numerous times. Some of their more recent
decisions are discussed below.
The Seventh Circuit examined the rights of detainees in Duran v.
Elrod.67 The detainees in the Cook County House of Correction and the
Cook County Jail alleged that the inadequate recreational facilities, lack of
visiting privileges, and inability to earn money for their defense constituted
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment and a denial of due process.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded
for further findings. The court said that the state's "sole permissible
interest ' 68 was to ensure the detainee's presence at trial. The court then
held that any restriction that is not "reasonably related to this sole stated
purpose of confinement would deprive a detainee of liberty or property
without due process., 69 The court did acknowledge that internal security
and limited finances are relevant to the issue.70 It limited the use of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause to simply "defining that which may never
be imposed on any inmate., 7 ' The treatment of detainees must be held to a
higher, more stringent standard because they have not yet been adjudicat-
ed guilty of a crime and thus may not be punished at all.72
In Smith v. Shimp73 the Seventh Circuit gave greater meaning to their
64. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
65. Id. at 7.
66. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
67. 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976).
68. Id. at 999.
69. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 1001.
71. Id. at 999-1000 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 1000.
73. 562 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1977).
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standard by holding that "jail security directly serves [the] interest [in
ensuring the detainee's presence at trial]. 74 In that case detainees were
challenging the facility's practice of spot-checking their mail. The court
stated that "if unmonitored use of the mail presents a substantial threat to
jail security, the burden imposed on the detainees' freedom to communi-
cate private matters is justified.",75 If a "less burdensome means ' 76 of
preserving the interest in security was available, however, the practice
would be unconstitutional.
The Fifth Circuit considered detainees' rights in Miller v. Carson,7 7 in
78
which violations of numerous constitutional provisions were alleged.
The court began by recognizing that detainees are to be presumed inno-
cent.7 9 It stated that "[a] government may hold a citizen without showing
that he had done wrong, but it may not punish him without proof."80 The
appropriate test in the Fifth Circuit is whether "the conditions placed on
the detainee are more restrictive than are necessary to assure his presence
at trial or to preserve security." 81 If so, the detention is, in fact, punishment
in violation of the due process clause. Applying this test, the court held that
the due process clause had been violated.82
The Fourth Circuit established its standard of review in Patterson v.
Morrisette.83 The conditions that were the basis of the suit were not
discussed. The court simply set out the standard to be used upon remand.
This standard required that when
in confinement [the detainee] can only be deprived of the constitutional rights
a [bailed] defendant awaiting trial enjoys to the extent such denial is required
to insure that he appears at trial and to restrain him from endangering or
disrupting the security of the institution in which he is detained, or to deter
him, if his conduct has already caused such danger or disruption, from
repeating such conduct. 84
Feeley v. Sampson 5 marked the First Circuit's first contact with the
issue of a detainee's constitutional rights. Although the court first declared
that due process would be violated by any condition or restriction "without
74. Id. at 425-26.
75. Id. at 426 (emphasis added).
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977).
78. Id. at 744.
79. Id. at 750.
80. Id. at 746 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 746.
83. 564 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
84. Id. at 1110, quoting Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 265 (D.Md. 1972) (emphasis
added).
85. 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978).
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reasonable relation to the state's purpose" 6 in producing the detainee at
trial, this is not the standard it in fact applied. Later in the opinion, 7 the
court stated that it would apply the same standard as "that normally
employed in reviewing administrative actions: whether the actions of jail
authorities are arbitrary or capricious; whether they are lacking in a
reasonable relationship to the limited purpose of the confinement; and
whether they are otherwise not in accordance with law. '8' This test is
further restricted by the court's statement that "judicial review in a case like
this should proceed under the standard we have described with proper
deference to be accorded legislative and local judgments especially in the
area of security within and without the jail." 9 This court disregards
relevant authority in the other circuits, basing its opinion instead upon
numerous cases dealing with the standard to be applied when restrictions
of the rights of convicted prisoners are at issue.90 The court deferred to the
judgment of the jail authorities, barring only arbitrary and capricious
abuses of power.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
rights of detainees in Campbell v. McGruder.9' The D.C. Circuit began its
analysis of the proper standard by acknowledging the difficulty of the task
and observing that the ultimate goal, "that the pretrial detainee 'be used
with the utmost humanity' ,92 must be kept in mind regardless of this
difficulty. 93 The court declared that the government's main purpose in
confining the detainee is assuring his appearance at trial,94 but this was not
considered to be its only cognizable interest. The court noted the govern-
ment's interest in its "ability to manage the institution of pretrial detention
in an administratively feasible manner."95
The court recognized that the detainee's interest is his liberty.96 It
stated that this liberty derives from the presumption of innocence 9 7 and
that "[t]he presumption of innocence is a shield that prevents 'the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction.' ,,98 The court went on to point out the
difficulty in distinguishing pretrial detention from punishment and con-
86. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 371.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 371-79.
91. 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 528, quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 300.
93. Id. at 527-28.
94. Id. at 528.
95. Id. at 529.
96. Id.
97. The presumption of innocence is a shorthand phrase used by many courts to denote the
proper attitude to be assumed when considering the rights of those who have been brought into the
criminal justice system but who have not yet been adjudicated guilty.
98. 580 F.2d 521, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1978), quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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cluded that not only was this incarceration punishment, but "as the
restrictions of the jail accumulate, the detainee's punishment becomes
more severe."
99
The court found that the proper test required a balancing of these
conflicting interests.' 00 The court then listed and described five guidelines
for the administration of this standard. First, the presumption of inno-
cence requires that each restriction be evaluated "to determine if it is
justified by substantial necessities of jail administration. To evaluate these
necessities [it] will look to the needs of the state to produce the detainee for
trial, to maintain the security of the jail, or generally to sustain the
institution of pretrial detention at a feasible cost."' 0 ' Second, the presump-
tion requires that the institution's responsibilities as a caretaker be proper-
ly discharged. Those conditions that are harmful to the detainee's physical
or mental health must be "subjected to the closest scrutiny and can be
justified only by the most compelling necessity."'' 0 2 Third, those conditions
that may adversely affect the outcome of the defendant's trial "are consti-
tutionally suspect" and can be justified only by the most compelling
necessity.0 3 Fourth, the length of time that the defendant is detained was
held relevant in determining the responsibilities of the institution. Finally,
if the conditions are such as to independently violate the Constitution, no
balancing should take place.
The Third Circuit's most recent decision dealing with the rights of
detainees is Norris v. Frame.10 4 There the court reaffirmed its earlier
statement that" 'the only legitimate state interest in the detention of an
accused who cannot raise bail is in guaranteeing his presence at trial.' 
0 5
The court held that "[a]dditional restrictions imposed on detainees are
defensible only when they can be justified by the requirements of prison
administration, or are inherent in the nature of confinement."'0 6
The Second Circuit's most recent case dealing with the constitutional-
ity of restrictions imposed upon pretrial detainees was Bell v. Wolfish.' °7
Bell was not, however, this court's first contact with the issue. It had
considered the question several times previously. 0 8 Detainees of Brooklyn
House of Detention v. Malcolm'0 9 is the decision in which the standard
applied by the district and appellate courts in Bell was first formulated.
99. Id. at 530.
100. Id at 531.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
104. 585 F.2d 1183 (1978).
105. Id. at 1187, quoting Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 827 (3rd Cir. 1976).
106. Id.
107. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
108. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975); Detainees of Brooklyn House of
Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
109. 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975).
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There the court stated: "In providing for their detention, correctional
institutions must be more than mere depositories for human baggage and
any deprivation or restriction of the detainees' rights beyond those which
are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a compelling
necessity."'110 Inadequate financial resources is not a sufficient reason for
denying a detainee's constitutional rights."'
These decisions were all decided before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Bell v. Wolfish. 12 All the courts of appeals that had consid-
ered the issue had recognized that the detainee had a liberty interest that
could be infringed upon by some kinds of restrictions imposed by the
administrators of the facility in which he was housed.1 3 All had recognized
that the state had an interest in ensuring the detainees' presence at trial.
Most also recognized the state's interest in maintaining jail security." 4 In
two circuits the courts expressly allowed cost to be considered;. 5 in the
Second Circuit, however, cost was expressly held to be an insufficient
excuse for deprivation of constitutional rights. 1 6 In two circuits the
restriction must be justified by compelling necessity;" 7 another requires
that the restriction be justified by or be inherent in the confinement;" and
one requires only that it not be arbitrary or capricious or that it be
reasonably related to the government's interest, with deference to be given
to administrators. 19
IV. Bell v. Wolfish
A. Facts and Holding
Pretrial detainees housed at the Metropolitan Correctional Center,
12 0
a federally operated custodial facility, brought this class action lawsuit
challenging a variety of conditions and practices at MCC as violative of
their constitutional rights. The district court enjoined more than twenty
practices that took place at MCC on statutory and constitutional
grounds.1 2' The court of appeals affirmed on many of these issues.
22
Only five of these conditions and practices were at issue before the
Supreme Court. The first was the practice of assigning two detainees to a
room designed for only one. This "double-bunking" was alleged to deprive
110. Id. at 397.
111. Id. at 399.
112. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
113. See text accompanying notes 67-111 supra.
114. See text accompanying notes 67-103 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 67-72 and 91-103 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 109-11 supra.
117. See text accompanying notes 91-103 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 67-84 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 104-06 supra.
120. Hereinafter referred to as MCC.
121. United States ex reL. Wolfish v. Levi, 428 F. Supp. 333, 439 F. Supp. 114 (1977).
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the detainees of their liberty in violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. The second was the prohibition against the receipt of
hard-cover books unless mailed by bookstores or the publisher. This
"publisher-only" rule, it was urged, violated the inmates' first amendment
rights. The third restriction challenged was the rule denying the inmates
the right to receive packages of food or personal belongings except at
Christmas. The fourth practice in question was the facility's requirement
that inmates not be present during routine room searches. Finally, the rule
requiring inmates to submit to strip searches complete with visual body
cavity inspections after every contact visit 23 was challenged. The court of
appeals failed to state which constitutional provisions were violated by
these latter three practices. For purposes of review the Supreme Court
assumed the court had based its holding on those issues upon the fifth
amendment due process clause and the fourth amendment search and
seizure provision.
The district court felt that the presumption of innocence and the fact
that detainees were "held only to ensure their presence at trial"124 required
the application of the test set out by the Second Circuit in Detainees of
Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm. 25 This test requires that
pretrial detainees may be subjected to only those restrictions and depriva-
tions which inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified by
compelling necessities of jail administration. 26 Applying this standard,
it enjoined the enforcement of the "publisher-only" rule and the practice of
"double-bunking" on motions for partial summary judgment.127 The other
conditions and practices in issue in the Supreme Court as well as a variety
of others were enjoined after trial.128 The Second Circuit, applying the
same standard, affirmed the district court's ruling on those issues of
relevance to this Comment.1
29
The Supreme Court rejected the compelling necessity standard and
formulated, instead, a type of rational basis test of its own. All the
restrictions and practices were held to meet this test. The lower courts were
reversed on all issues.
B. The Majority Rationale
The issues to be decided in Bell dealt with the nature and scope of a
122. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978).
123. A contact visit is a visit between an inmate and an outsider during which they are allowed
to touch each other.
124. United States ex reL Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
125. 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 108-09 supra.
126. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), citing De-
tainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 397 (2nd Cir. 1975).
127. Wolfish v. Levi, 428 F. Supp. 333 (1977).
128. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114 (1977).
129. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978).
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detainee's constitutional rights and the appropriate standard to be applied
in determining whether these rights have been violated. The majority
opinion began by analyzing the "double-bunking" practice because it was
"alleged only to deprive pretrial detainees of their liberty without due
process of law."
130
The Court pointed out that it could not find a source in the Constitu-
tion for the compelling necessity standard applied by the lower courts.131
The presumption of innocence, the Court said, is an insufficient founda-
tion to rely upon in formulating a test of the constitutionality of pretrial
detention conditions.
The Court held that the due process clause requires only that an
individual not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.1 32 It does not
require that he be free from discomfort, as such a freedom is not encom-
passed within the term "liberty."' 3 3 The standard to be used in determining
whether the dictates of due process are being met is "whether those
conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.'' 6 To implement this
standard, the term "punishment" had to be defined. The Court attempted
to do so by setting out the traditional tests of punitive intent first set forth
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez:
135
"Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the tradition-
al aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the
inquiry, and may often point in differing directions."' 36
After setting out these guidelines, however, the Court chose to give
effect to only the last two: "'[w]hether an alternative purpose to which [the
restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]." 3 7
These guidelines constitute the Court's two-prong punitive intent test.
The first prong of this test is limited in its applicability by the fact that
any restriction that is not "arbitrary or purposeless" can be said to be
rationally connected to a legitimate goal.'38 In determining whether a
particular restriction is arbitrary or purposeless the courts were admon-
130. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530 (1979).
131. Id. at 532.
132. Id. at 535.
133. Id. at 534.
134. Id. at 535.
135. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
136. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 537-38, quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-69 (1963).
137. Id. at 538.
138. Id. at 539.
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ished not to substitute their judgment for that of the administrators." 9
While it is true that ensuring the detainee's presence at trial is a
legitimate goal, justifying restraints during detention, the Court held that it
is not the only one. "[T]he effective management of the detention facility
once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposi-
tion of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any
inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment.' 40 Any mea-
sure that can be characterized as for security purposes is within the
meaning of "management of the facility."'141 The Court expressly avoided
any further clarification of the alternative purposes that would be constitu-
tionally permissible. 142 Nor did the Court provide any guidance concern-
ing how the second prong of the test is to be implemented. The Court
expressly stated that comparisons with professional recommendations and
practices at other institutions are not to take place. 1
43
Applying this two-prong test to the practice of "double-bunking," the
Court found no violation of due process to have occurred. 44 The Court
admitted that the rooms were small,145 but considered the fact that the
detainees were locked in their rooms for only seven hours a day, coupled
with the fact that most were released from the institution within sixty days,
sufficient to make the treatment constitutional. 46 The Court did not
believe that the ability to comply with the district court order to cease
"double-bunking" was at all relevant in determining the reasonableness of
the practice.1
47
The majority then set out four principles that it would consider when
evaluating the constitutionality of the other four practices. The first was
that neither convicted prisoners nor detainees "forfeit all constitutional
protection by reason of their . . . confinement." 148 The second was "that
these rights are . . . subject to restrictions and limitations.' ' 149 The third
was that "maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order
and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction
of the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and
pretrial detainees."'50 The fourth principle required that deference be
shown to detention facility officials even when they, in fact, have no
expertise.151
139. Id. at 540 n.23.
140. Id. at 540.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 543 n.27.
144. Id. at 542.
145. Id. at 543.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 542-43 n.25.
148. Id at 545.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 546.
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The Court then analyzed the four remaining practices at issue in light
of these principles to determine whether they constituted independent
constitutional violations. All of these practices were held to be constitu-
tional. The Court then applied the punitive intent test to determine if any
of these practices constituted punishment. The Court held that they did
not.
C. Separate Opinions
Mr. Justice Powell agreed with the majority except that he felt that
"some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, should be required to
justify the anal and genital searches described in this case. 152
Mr. Justice Marshall attacked the majority's standard as ineffectual
and pointed out its failure to consider what he felt to be "the most relevant
factor, the impact that restrictions may have on inmates. ' 153 Justice
Marshall felt that the majority's "due process-punishment" test might have
been useful if effect had been given to all of the Kennedy tests. 54 The
failure to do so, however, "contract[ed] a broad standard, sensitive to the
deprivations imposed on detainees, into one that seeks merely to sanitize
official motives and prohibit irrational behavior."'155
Justice Marshall advocated instead "[a] test that balances the depriva-
tions involved against the state interests assertedly served. . . . The
greater the imposition on detainees, the heavier burden ofjustification the
Government would bear."' 156 At the least, Justice Marshall would "require
a showing that a restriction is substantially necessary to jail administra-
tion." 57 If, however, the restriction implicates fundamental interests or
"inflicts significant harms," the restriction must meet a more stringent test:
it must serve "a compelling necessity of jail administration."'5 8 Applying
this standard, Justice Marshall would remand on the question of "double-
bunking" because no real factual inquiry was made prior to granting
summary judgment. 159 He would affirm the lower courts on all other
issues. 60
Mr. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice
Brennanj oined. Justice Stevens viewed the majority's holding that" 'under
the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law' ,,161 as a
151. Id. at 547.
152. Id. at 563.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 564.
155. Id. at 565.
156. Id. at 569-70.
157. Id. at 570.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 572.
160. Id. at 572-80.
161. id. at 580.
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positive step away from the strictures imposed upon due process adjudica-
tion by the entitlement theory. To Justice Stevens, "[t]he due process
guarantee is individual and personal. . . . [A]n innocent person [must]
be treated as an individual human being and be free of treatment which, as
to him, is punishment."
162
Justice Stevens characterized the majority's test as "unduly permis-
sive."1 63 He would use a more objective test.1 64 He, too, would evaluate
punitive intent by reference to the Mendoza-Martinez165 tests, but like
Justice Marshall, and unlike the majority, he would apply the first two as
well as the last two. 66 Applying this standard, Justice Stevens would
remand on the constitutionality of the "double-bunking"'167 and affirm the
lower courts on all other issues.
68
V. Bell v. Wolfish: A HEALTHY SENSE OF REALISM
A. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
The majority approached the question of the constitutionality of the
"double-bunking" practice first because it was "alleged only to deprive
pretrial detainees of their liberty without due process of law in contraven-
tion of the Fifth Amendment."'169 The other four practices were then
analyzed in terms of individual provisions of the Constitution to determine
if they were independently violative of the Constitution. Once they were
analyzed in those terms, they were then analyzed in terms of the test set out
by the majority in the first part of the opinion to determine if they violated
the detainees' interest in liberty. The Court's analysis of these four prac-
tices as independent constitutional violations is not discussed in this Com-
ment. Discussion will instead be centered on the majority's formulation of
the standard to be applied when only a "liberty" interest is at issue.
The majority began its analysis of the appropriate standard by rele-
gating the presumption of innocence to the status of a mere procedural
tool.170 It is to be used to assign the burden of proof in a criminal trial and
to admonish the jurors to determine a defendant's innocence or guilt based
only on the evidence produced at that trial. The majority was willing to
admit that the presumption of innocence "plays an important role in our
criminal justice system,"' 71 but refused to allow it to play any role at all in
162. Id. at 584.
163. Id. at 585.
164. Id. at 586.
165. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
166. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 588 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 596.
168. Id. at 589.
169. Id. at 530.
170. Id. at 533.
171. Id.
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establishing the constitutional rights of detainees. This position is not
supported by the majority opinion's discussion, nor is it supportable.
The presumption of innocence is a doctrine "not predicated upon any
express provision of the federal constitution, but upon ancient concepts
antedating the development of the common law." 172 It is more than just a
procedural tool. It is, in fact, not a presumption at all in the strict eviden-
tiary sense of that term. While it is true that it is the foundation upon which
the decision to allocate the burden of proof in a criminal trial is based, that
is not the only role this important doctrine has played in the development
of our law.
Eighty-five years ago the Supreme Court observed "[t]he principle
that there is a presumption of innocence . . . lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.' 73 The operation of the bail system
and the management of detention facilities come under the rubric of
"administration of our criminal law." The Court has acknowledged this in
two opinions. Almost twenty years ago, in Stack v. Boyle,174 the Court
recognized that the presumption of innocence was not only a procedural
tool but also that it had particular relevance to the administration of the
bail system and the treatment to be accorded detainees. After Bell, it is
doubtful that the presumption will have relevance to either.
The majority then pointed out that the initial decision to detain is not
at issue in Bell. 75 While it is true that the constitutionality of detention was
not to be decided here, it was important for the Court to take into
consideration the fact that the bail system was not being administered
according to the goals set out in bail statutes or by the Court itself in Stack
v. Boyle. 176 Were the system administered according to these goals of
ensuring the detainee's presence at trial and preventing punishment prior
to a determination of guilt, a large part of the problems in detention today
would be alleviated. The most obvious way to avoid overcrowding and
excessive use of government funds for housing detainees is by placing
fewer persons in detention. Many bail statutes, including the Bail Reform
Act of 1966,177 under which the detainees in Bell were held, provide for a
variety of release provisions in lieu of setting bail. Unfortunately many
judges have lost sight of the statutory goals and have embossed the system
with their own design. The majority's failure to look at the realities of the
bail system must account, at least in part, for its failure to accord the
pretrial detainee greater constitutional rights.
The majority then turned to fashioning its own standard of review.
172. Reynolds v. United States, 238 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1956).
173. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
174. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
175. 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
176. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
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The Court stated that "the Due Process Clause protects a detainee from
certain conditions and restrictions of pretrial detainment." When the
only interest at stake is deprivation of liberty, however, the majority
limited the due process clause to protecting the detainee from only those
conditions that amount to punishment.19 The Court based this freedom
from punishment upon the fact that the detainee has not yet been found
guilty of a crime. Thus, while the Court refused to indulge in a presumption
that the detainee is innocent, it did admit that he may not yet be deemed
guilty.
According to the majority, however, the detainee's interest in freedom
from discomfort is of insufficient weight to merit constitutional protec-
tion. The Court stated "that a detainee's desire to be free from discom-
fort . .. simply does not rise to the level of those fundamental liberty
interests delineated in cases such as Roe v. Wade, .. .Eisenstadt v.
Baird, . . . Stanley v. Illinois, . . . Griswold v. Connecticut, ...
rand] Meyer v. Nebraska."'180 In fact the detainee's liberty interest is even
more worthy of protection.
In Ingraham v. Wright'8' the Court stated: "The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment . ..was intended to give Americans at least the
protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed as English-
men against the power of the Crown."' 82 The cases cited by the Court in
Bell as recognizing "fundamental liberty interests" were those concerning
the individual's privacy interest in matters of family planning or custody
and education of children. While the common law of England had not
expressly provided individuals such protections it recognized the need for
protecting the detainee:
Upon the whole, if the offense be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he
is to be committed to the county goal by the mittimus of the justice ... ;
there to abide till delivered by due course of law. . . .But this imprison-
ment, as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment:
therefore, in this dubious interval between the commitment and the trial, a
prisoner ought to be used with the the utmost humanity, and neither be
loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as are
absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only.'83
Thus, from the beginning, the majority in Bell allowed the detainee
only limited protection of his constitutional rights. In limiting his interest
to freedom from punishment the Court allows the detainee to "be loaded
with needless fetters [and] subjected to other hardships" so long as these do
not rise to the level of punishment.
178. 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
179. Id. at 535.
180. Id. at 534-35 (citations omitted).
181. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
182. Id. at 672-73.
183. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 300.
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Based upon its holding that a detainee may not be punished, the
majority stated the appropriate test to be "whether those conditions [or
restrictions] amount to punishment of the detainee. '8 '4 To implement this
test the term "punishment" had to be defined. The Court first pointed out
that there is a difference between punitive measures and regulatory
restraints. 185 Regulatory restraints are constitutional; punitive measures
imposed prior to an adjudication of guilt are not. The Court then cited
three cases in which this distinction was made.
These cases, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,18 6 Flemming v.
Nestor,187 and DeVeau v. Braisted,18 8 all dealt with the issue whether
particular legislative acts were punitive in nature or merely regulatory.
They all support the idea that the purpose behind the statute is
determinative. 89 If Congress intended to punish these persons, the act will
be characterized as punitive. If there was no intent to punish, there was no
punishment 90
The Court in Mendoza-Martinez recognized the difficulties inherent
in determining the legislative intent behind any particular statute. It
therefore set out several factors to consider in determining whether the
purpose behind a statute is punishment. These same factors were set out by
the Court in Bell, where they were characterized as "useful guideposts."
Apparently, all of these "guideposts" were not equally useful since the
Court chose to give effect to only the last two in formulating its test of
punitive intent.191
Unless the detainee can show "expressed intent to punish on the part
of detention facility officials,"19 2 the determination of whether the detain-
ees' constitutional rights have been violated will turn on "[w]hether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it]."'1 93 Since the likelihood of a detainee
being able to show an express punitive intent is very small, the determina-
tion whether a constitutional provision has been violated will nearly
always turn upon the answers given to these two questions. Thus, these two
questions constitute the majority's two-prong punitive intent test.
184. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
185. Id. at 537.
186. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
187. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
188. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
189. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 613-14 (1960); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960).
190. In an earlier opinion, not cited by the Court in Bell, the Supreme Court had recognized that
"the severity of the disability imposed . . . is relevant to this decision." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,96
n.18 (1958).
191. 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
192. Id. at 538.
193. Id.
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To make the first prong of the test useful the Court must answer two
questions. The first is which "alternative purposes" will satisfy the test. The
second is what is the meaning of "rationally connected." The Court
answers the second of these questions by pointing out that "a restriction or
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal if it is arbitrary or
purposeless.' ' 94 Apparently then, any restriction or condition that is less
than arbitrary or purposeless is "rationally connected." Add to this the fact
that judges are not to substitute their judgments for those of administra-
tors and this part of the test becomes meaningless.
The permissible "alternative purposes" to which this restriction must
be rationally connected are never fully delineated. The Court did not feel
the need to do so:
We need not here attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate
governmental interests that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial
detention. It is enough simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the
detainees' presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility
once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition
of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference
that such restrictions are intended as punishment. 9
The second prong of the Court's punitive intent test is "[w]hether [the
restriction] appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed [to it]."' 9 6 This would appear to require a comparison of the
practices and restrictions imposed in this institution with those imposed in
similar institutions where the same objectives are sought. Instead, the
Court discourages such comparison by pointing out that it would serve no
purpose since the particular facts in each case differ. 97
In recognizing that the due process clause prohibits the punishment of
a detainee, the Court appeared to score a major victory for the detainee. It
did not. In fact, this was a major loss. First, restrictions on detainees that
do not rise to the level of independent constitutional violations and that do
not rise to the level of punishment, however that term is defined, are not
cognizable under the due process clause. In contrast, the tests applied by
many of the lower courts and the tests applied by Justice Marshall would
have considered restrictions to have violated the detainees' right to liberty
when they were not necessary to the attainment of the goals of the bail
system. The detainees' rights were further narrowed by the Court's con-
struction of the term "punishment" to include only those restrictions or
practices imposed with punitive intent.
As Justice Marshall pointed out, it is extremely unrealistic to make
the detention administrators' intent the central element in determining the
194. Id. at 539.
195. Id. at 540.
196. Id. at 538.
197. Id. at 543 n.27.
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constitutionality of the restrictions they impose. 98 He cited two main
reasons. First, the intent behind legislative acts like those in question in
Mendoza-Martinez,199 Flemming,00 and De Veau2°' is much more easily
discerned than the intent behind the administrative decisions of detention
officials. Second, those officials may honestly, but mistakenly, believe that
institutional security requires a particular restriction.
It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the detainee could prove an
express punitive intent on the part of detention facility administrators.
This inability of the detainee to prove an express intent to punish will
require that he prove that (1) there is no alternative purpose to which the
restriction can rationally be connected or (2) the restriction is excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. To carry this burden the
detainee must, in effect, prove that no purpose other than punishment can
possibly be ascribed to the restriction in issue without even the benefit of
evidence of how the same security need is met at similar institutions.
The majority then described four principles to be considered in
deciding the constitutionality of the other four practices in issue. Although
this Comment is not concerned with the details of the Court's analysis of
these practices as independent constitutional violations, these principles
are illustrative of the attitude with which the Court approached the case as
a whole.
The first principle was "that [since] convicted prisoners do not forfeit
all constitutional protections by reason of their confinement in pris-
on . .. , pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes,
,,2012
retain at least those constitutional rights. The second principle was that
"these rights [of both prisoners and detainees] are . .. subject to restric-
tions and limitations., 20 3 The third was that "maintaining institutional
security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals
that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional
rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees. 20 4 The Court
then cited Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union20 5 for the
proposition that "even when an institutional restriction infringes a specific
constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the practice must
be evaluated in light of the central objective of prison administration,
safeguarding institutional security. '206 The majority cited Pell v. Procun-
ier in support of its final principle: "in the absence of substantial
198. Id. at 565.
199. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
200. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
201. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
202. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
203. Id. at 545.
204. Id. at 546.
205. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
206. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
207. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their
response to these considerations, [the preservation of internal security,
order and discipline and the maintenance of institutional security] courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters." 208 This is
true, said the Court, even in those cases in which the "expert" has no
background in corrections but has acquired his position "only by Act of
Congress or of a state legislature., 20 9 This was in part because of the
Court's view that the "operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly
the province of the Legislative and Executive branches. 210
These four principles reflect the majority's narrow view of the consti-
tutional rights of pretrial detainees. Although the Court began by pointing
out that detainees have "at least those rights . . . enjoyed by convicted
prisoners, 2 it ends by pointing out that they, in fact, have no more than
those same rights. Both Jones and Pell, the two cases the Court cites in
support of its last two principles, applied a rational basis test in the prison
context and required extensive deference to administrators.2 This same
test is applied here in the detention context although it is clothed in an
apparently more complex style. The two-prong punitive intent test de-
scribed by the Court in Bell requires only that the restriction or condition
have a rational relationship to a purpose other than punishment and that
deference is to be accorded to detention administrators in determining
what purpose is to be assigned to any particular restriction. Thus, not only
has the "hands-off' approach returned to examinations of the constitu-
tional rights of convicted prisoners, but it has been extended to cover
questions concerning the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.
B. Why This Decision?
Several factors played a part in the majority's decision in Bell. The
first was the Court's belief that detention facility officials have greater
experience and expertise in the area of detention administration than do
judges.213 The second factor was the Court's view that, even in those cases
in which the administrator does not in fact have greater expertise and
experience than the judge, the judge should not interfere because the
administration of detention facilities has been entrusted to the legislative
and executive branches of government. 214 The Court apparently felt that it
would be overstepping the jurisdiction of the federal courts to undertake
review of this type of decision when made by the other branches of
government. A third factor, one not mentioned by the Court, may very
well have been a desire to decrease the caseload of the federal courts.
208. Id. at 827.
209. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979).
210. Id. at 547 n.29.
211. Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
212. See discussion accompanying notes 38-45 supra.
213. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
214. Id. at 547 n.29.
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Approximately one of every eight cases filed in the federal courts of
appeals are prisoner's rights cases.21 5 It would, under these circumstances,
be reasonable to assume that an opinion narrowly construing the rights of
detainees would cause a substantial decrease in the federal court caseload.
Another factor that the Court may have considered in deciding Bell is
the impact that this decision would have on the administration of deten-
tion facilities across the United States. Because conditions at most deten-
tion facilities across the country are decidedly worse than those at MCC,
21 6
to have held the restrictions and practices at MCC unconstitutional would
have meant that nearly every detention center in the United States was
violating the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees on a daily basis. The
Court simply could not bring itself to make such a sweeping holding.
C. What This Opinion Means To Detainees
When the history of our criminal justice system is chronicled, no doubt one of
its most sobering pages will describe the sad state of this nation's prisons and
jails. Whether it be in filthy, narrow cells of an Alabama penitentiary or in
overcrowded dormitories in a Bronx house of detention, we have quartered
individuals, both convicted or merely accused of crimes, major and minor,
under conditions that shock the conscience of civilized men.
217
Bell v. Wolfish strikes a severe blow to those who advocate humane
treatment of those detained in the jails of this country. It marks a return to
the "hands-off' approach of fifteen years ago. It is true that the govern-
ment has a valid interest in maintaining the internal security of detention
facilities. This interest, however, must not be allowed to abrogate totally
all the constitutional rights of those who must be detained. These persons
are to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law. They
must be accorded treatment that does not infringe upon their right to be as
free as possible while the state pursues its one legitimate interest in deten-
tion: securing the accused's appearence at trial. Before Bell many federal
courts would have allowed this freedom. Now they cannot.
The Court's near-total deference to the decisions of detention officials
fails to recognize that "power corrupts" and that even well-meaning
persons sometimes overestimate the exigencies of a situation. "[T]he Due
Process Clause [was] designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more,
than mediocre ones., 21 8 By failing to apply the due process clause "to
protect the fragile values" of these detainees, the Court has abdicated the
215. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR U.S.
COURTS 12 (1976).
216. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 366-68 (lst Cir. 1978), Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741,
744-45 (5th Cir. 1977).
217. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1978).
218. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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judiciary's traditional role of determining guilt and innocence and allowed
this role to be taken by detention administrators and, all too often, by
individual prison guards.
The realities of detention conditions should be sufficient evidence that
the executive and legislative branches are not properly performing their
duties. The facilities in which detainees are housed are often worse than
those provided for convicted prisoners. 219 "Inadequate ventilation, poor
lighting, fetid aromas, noise, sickening food, dirty blankets, leaky roofs,
and lax security characterize many jails"220 in this country. Overcrowding
is also common, resulting in many detainees sleeping on the floor. These
horrid physical conditions are a constant threat to health and safety. Were
the legislative and executive branches of government acting responsibly
toward these detainees, the courts would not need to review their decisions.
Since the other branches are not fulfilling their duty in this regard, the
courts must act responsibly to see that these conditions are improved.
D. Alternative Approaches
The better approach is that advocated by Justice Marshall. He rightly
noted that "the Due Process Clause focuses on the nature of deprivations,
not on the persons inflicting them. . . . [I]t is the effect of conditions of
confinement, not the intent behind them, that must be the focal point of
constitutional analysis."22'
Marshall favored a balancing test. At the least he would require the
detention officials to show that the condition or practice is "substantially
necessary to jail administration., 2 2 If, however, the restriction "inflicts
significant harms" or implicates fundamental interests, administrators
must show that it "serves a compelling necessity of jail administration., 223
This standard requires both the detainee and the detention officials to
prove their cases. Marshall recognized that the detainee has liberty inter-
ests other than freedom from punishment but was realistic in his approach
to protecting these interests. He acknowledged that the government has an
interest in "the security and administrative needs of the institution as well
as . .. fiscal constraints. 2 24 Unlike the majority, however, Marshall
would require proof that these needs are in fact the basis for imposing a
particular restriction. He is unwilling to presume that these reasons alone
underlie all detention facility decisions. In fact, when he applies this test to
the conditions at issue in Bell, they all fail.
2 25
219. CORRECTIONS, supra note 61, at 99,102 (1973); THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 24, 25 (1967).
220. LEAA SURVEY, supra note 52 at 22.
221. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 567 (1979).
222. Id. at 570.
223. Id..
224. Id. at 570-71.
225. Id. at 572-73.
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Other steps could also have been taken. Detainees could be given
greater access to lawyers to decrease the federal courts' caseload. These
attorneys could serve as a screening device for the courts. In this way fewer
trivial suits would be filed. Also, grievance procedures could be set up
within the detention facility to handle many of those complaints that do
not rise to the level of constitutional violations even under the balancing
test but which do create needless discomfort for an individual detainee.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has sought both to analyze the Court's holding and
rationale in Bell v. Wolfish, and to place this opinion in perspective. In
reaching this goal it has been necessary to examine the Supreme Court's
prior disposition of prisoner's rights cases, to distinguish the status of a
detainee from that of a convicted prisoner, and to review the standards
applied by the various courts of appeals who have considered these ques-
tions.
Blackstone stated over 200 years ago that "a detainee ought to be used
with the utmost humanity, and neither be loaded with needless fetters, or
subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the
purpose of confinement only. 226 It is a sad commentary on the current
state of American jurisprudence to admit that today's standard is less than
the one applied at the time this country was founded. This is particularly
discouraging since our forefathers attempted to make provisions against
such infringements of a citizen's liberty by including protections in the
Constitution and by providing for each of the three branches of govern-
ment to serve as a check on the others.
In Bell, the majority shows a complete abdication ofjudicial responsi-
bility. This is made especially clear by the requirement that courts defer
even to those administrators whose expertise is based solely upon the fact
that they were appointed to their positions of authority. While administra-
tion of penal and detention facilities is admittedly within the realm of the
executive and legislative branches of our government, it is the responsibili-
ty of the judiciary, and the judiciary alone, to determine who will and who
will not be punished. Detainees have not yet been determined to be guilty
and thus in need of punishment. The judiciary must not let this important
decision be taken over by the other branches of government.
Teresa K Scarberry
226. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 300.
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